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Abstract
Market perestroika and integration into the world  economy require  strengthening
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in  transition economies like  Russia.  This
paper  examines  patterns  and emerging  trends in piracy and protection of IPRs in Russia  and
analyzes the economic effects of  strengthening  IPRs in  the  context of  Russia's market
transition.  In the early 1990s,  Russia  brought IPR legislation up to international standards.
Yet IPR enforcement  remains weak,  and piracy of foreign software,  trademarks,  audio- and
videocassettes  flourishes.  Ineffective IPR protection stifles innovation, trade, and  direct
foreign investment,  and may become  an obstacle  to Russia's  future membership  in the World
Trade Organization.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Protection  of intellectual  property rights  --patents,  trademarks, copyrights,  etc.  --is  a
major instrument for fostering innovation and growth in a market economy.  By granting a
temporary monopoly on the commercial  use of innovations,  intellectual property rights allow
the owners to  recoup research  and development  expenses  and to  earn a  return  on  their
innovations. For that reason, protection of  intellectual property rights  stimulates private
investment  in research  and development. Furthermore,  intellectual property rights encourage
the dissemination  of technological  information by making patent documentation  available  to
In general,  assignment  and protection of  intellectual property rights are viable the public,
only if private property is recognized  in a society.
During the Soviet  period, Russia  stifled private ownership  of intellectual assets  along
with physical ones. The monopoly on the commercial use of innovations belonged to the
state, while  domestic inventors received only  certificates confirming  their  authorship
Eventually. market reforms brought discernible changes to  the  protection of  intellectual
property  rights (IPRs). In the early 1990s,  Russia  joined major international IPR conventions
and adopted new IPR laws comparable with those in industrialized countries. Yet current
enforcement  of new IPR laws remains  weak,  and piracy of software,  audio- and videocassettes,
etc., is wide-spread  in Russia.
As  market  transition continues, underlying  economic forces  progressively push
towards  strengthening  domestic IPR protection. First of all, with the formation of a market
economy,  Russian  innovators  develop  stakes  in the strong  protection  of intellectual assets. To
benefit from the international transfer of technologies  as well as research  and development
cooperation, domestic firms  need tight  IPR  protection. Likewise,  foreign  companies
interested  in trade, technology  transfer,  and direct foreign investment  in Russia  urge stronger
IPR protection.  Lastly, effective IPR enforcement  is likely  to be a condition for  Russia's3
becomes  an important part of domestic  science  and technology policy  aimed at promoting
R&D with commercial applications.  In general,  designing an appropriate IPR regime for
transition economies  is not straightforward  and should take into account specific features of
such  economies.
This  paper focuses on the analysis of IPR  protection in light  of Russia's  transition to a
market economy.  The task is to examine existing patterns  of legal protection, enforcement,
and  infringement  of  IPRs in  Russia. Efficiency  and rent-seeking incentives, as well as
economic effects of  strengthening  IPRs are also considered. Finally,  the  paper suggests
future policy directions of IPR protection  in Russia.
ll.  FROM AN AWARD-BASED SYSTEM TO PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
In  tsarist Russia  before World War I,  major types of intellectual property, such as
patents,  copyrights, and trademarks,  received  adequate  protection  by contemporary  standards.
With the Bolshevik revolution and the introduction of the "war  communism"  regime in
1917,  Russia's  participation in the international system  of IPR protection abruptly came to a
halt.  For the next seventy  years,  IPR protection virtually ceased  to exist. In  1919  it  was
replaced by a state  monopoly on the use of inventions,  trademarks,  and other assets. Some
types of intellectual property, for example,  computer software,  and trade secrets,  received  no
protection at all.  Inventors  were given  an author certificate,  a.k.a., a document certifying the
invention, its priority, and authorship,  and occasionally  an award in the form of tangible assets
such  as money,  an apartment,  a car, etc., as well as  prestige  and publicity (Table 1).4
TABLE 1
Number of Applications for Protective  Documents,  1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980'
(thousand  units)











a.  Data refer to the Soviet  Union.
b.  Annual average  for the period from 1980-85.
Source:  USSR  State Committee  on Statistics  (Goskomstat),  Narodnoe  khoziaistvo  SSSR,  (various
issues),  Finansy  i  statistika:  Moscow,  Russia.
Although the new economic  policy of 1924-31  made  patents  an officially  recognized
fonn  of protection of inventions,  patents  were barely used in the Soviet  Union.  During the
socialist period, patents  accounted for  about one percent of  all domestic applications for
protection of inventions,  and were registered  mainly for the purpose  of external patenting  and
licensing. The  Patent Cooperation Treaty, the  European Patent Convention, and  the
Agreement on Mutual Recognition of  Author Certificates  and Other Protective Documents
provided a basis for external patenting  of domestic  inventions. By the early 1990s,  more than
18,500  domestic  inventions received  protection in 63 countries,  including almost  70 percent
in industrialized  countries,  28 percent  in the fonner socialist  countries,  and about two percent
in developing countries (CSRS,  1992a).  Between  1970 and 1990, Russia's trade in licenses
substantially  increased. For example,  total receipts  from exports of licenses  went up by about
55 times from 1970  to 1990,  while the total number  of licenses  sold reached  4,582 in the end
of 1990.  In the 1980s,  about 65 percent  of licenses  were exported to the former  socialist6
mission to promote the enactment  of  strong IPR legislation and  develop regulations and
enforcement  mechanisms  for curbing violations.4
(Robinson 1995).
ill.  PIRACY  AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY RIGHTS
Notwithstanding the  historical  significance  of  policy  refomlS,  advancements
concerning  IPR protection  are to no avail unless  complemented  by an adequate  enforcement
of new  IPR laws.  According to an international survey of business  executives  conducted by
the World  Economic Forum, IPR protection in Russia was poor and substantially lower than in
China, South Korea, and Taiwan in 1995 (Chui et a11996). An effective resolution of  IPR
disputes  is dubious  in Russia,  since  the country lacks special  courts for  IPR issues  and many
judges have insufficient experience  and training in intellectual property law.  Furthermore,7
demonstration  software (Harmon 1996).  Russians  also justify  software piracy as a market
promotion  tool beneficial for  foreign companies. With low real incomes, most domestic
customers cannot afford  expensive copyrighted  software. By  purchasing  cheap  [but
software rather  than a pirated version.
Like  software piracy,  counterfeiting  of  foreign trademarks, tradenames and
appellations of  origin  remains rampant in  Russia. Domestic manufacturers of  shoes,
computers,  videocassettes,  and consumer  electronics  use foreign company names and logos
5 To prevent piracy losses,  foreign companies  adopt  alternative strategies, such  as cooperative agreements  with
major Russian  computer  manufacturers,  and maintain  an active presence  in Russia's  market.
6 Industry's estimates of piracy losses are  often biased upward,  as they assume  that the purchased  quantity of  a
higher-priced  legal good would be  the same  as  the purchased  quantity of the pirated good.  This is an unrealistic
premise in most cases,  since the price of a legal  item is  likely  to become prohibitive  for some consumers.
Moreover, estimates are often based on prices in industrialized countries, in  which  the  price  structure and
consumer  incomes typically differ from that in the pirating country.  Finally,  innovator industries may have an
incentive to overstate their losses for lobbying  purposes.  Therefore,  estimates of  piracy losses are usually
indicative rather than definite measure~  of the extent  of piracy and hence  should  be interpreted with caution.
7 Pirated software sometimes  represents  a so-called beta-version, i.e.,  trial  and imperfect one, and may have
viruses. Descriptions  and manuals  are of low quality or completely  lacking.  In addition, users of pirated software
are denied access  to customer  support  lines.  -8
for  marketing purposes.  For example, Russian  industry experts estimate that a false label
"Made in USA" increases  total sales  of computer  hardware  by about  20 percent. Despite the
attractiveness  of foreign trademarks  and tradenames,  Russian  pirates commonly recognize  the
ethical wrong-doing. Furthermore,  domestic  companies  gradually  become  more familiar with
a legal way of using foreign trademarks  --licensing  the trademark and manufacturing the
original equipment  under  a contract  with the trademark  owner. To cite an instance,  a Russian
computer manufacturing company, Micron,8  successfully produces microprocessors for
South Korea's  Sarnsung,  while  a  Moscow watch manufacturer,  1st MChZ,  assemblies
chronographs,  high precision  mechanisms,  for the Swiss  Rolex and Omega  (Sinitskii 1996).
The dynamics of videocassette  piracy demonstrate  a tendency  towards strengthening
IPR protection.  In  1995, the total turnover of Russian  video pirates was estimated at about
$500 million  (Golubev and Borisov 1995).9 Part of this revenue represented  losses  to the
original recording producers. As recently  mentioned  in Los Angeles Times,  the US recording
industry argues  that it has lost about  $240 million to Russian  video pirates in 1995 (Harmon
1996).10  Yet Russian  finDS often see  piracy as their temporal occupation and prefer to do
legal business. As a rule, revenues  from selling better  quality and higher  priced videocassettes
under a copyright license from the owner exceed  those for  pirated videos.  Prices of legal
videocassettes  are greater  than those  of pirated  versions  by two-three times, while the quantity
demanded does not differ  significantly. However, new domestic video  firms  often  lack
sufficient  funds  to  purchase copyright  licenses. By  distributing  pirated  videocassettes,
Russian  video firms  try to accumulate  the necessary  capital and eventually switch to  legal
video  business.Skillful  bargaining with foreign copyright owners is likely  to alleviate the
8 The Russian  manufacturer  is not related  to the US computer  company  with the same  name.
9 Recent  US movies,  for example,  "True Lies" and "Specialist",  became  available in Russia a day  before their US
premiere from retail stores  in Moscow (Golubev  and Borisov 1995).
10 These  estimates  are likely to overstate  piracy losses. See  footnote  No.6  above.9
need for  capital, and Russian producers gradually  gain experience in  such bargaining
(Liudmirskii  1996).
Additionally,  domestic video  fInnS are  taking  steps to  enforce  IPR  protection
independently and in  cooperation with government  authorities. Domestic video industry
recently started publishing a reference list  of  legally purchased and distributed movies.
Pirating and illegal distribution of movies on the list are  rare, as  legal firms effectively enforce
copyrights  by  soliciting  police raids of  videocassette  market places and confiscation of
pirated versions  (Liudmirskii  1996).  Altogether, the profit advantages  of legal business,  as
well as private and public  efforts to  enforce IPRs, provide a basis for  the  reduction of
videocassette  piracy in the future.
Unlike software  and video copyrights, those for books and other literary works are
already well-protected in Russia. At present,  most new  books are published under a license
for copyrights. This was not the case  before 1993, when book piracy flourished.  Violations
of  book copyrights ended with the adoption of the domestic copyright  law and Russia's
The Association  of Authors and Publishers  Against Pirating joining  the Berne Convention.
and individual publishing agencies  actively started  to enforce copyrights by  initiating  legal
suits against  pirates. These  efforts significantly contributed to the decline in book piracy
Russia's  private publishing agencies  are now acquiring licenses  to copyrighted books rather
than pirating them.
As a whole, Russia's IPRs, with the  exception of  software copyrights, have been
progressing towards stronger protection since the early 1990s. Such a trend  commonly
emerges  in developing  countries  (see  La Croix 1992,  Tabatchnaia-  Tamirisa and Konan 1996,
Chui et al1996).  Over time, as a developing economy moves closer to the technological
frontier,  promotion  of  indigenous innovation becomes more  important than  imitation,
increasing incentives  for tightening IPRs. Correspondingly,  the political  economy balance10
shifts in  favor of  strong protection, as domestic innovator industries gain more  lobbying
power,  supported by the foreign pressure for  tighter IPR protection.
In Russia,  government  authorities  are making efforts to limit piracy and enforce IPR
laws. Russia's  Customs Committee, for  example, recently issued a  special instruction
regulating the procedure for  the seizure of  counterfeit Barbie  dolls  infringing  on  the
trademark rights  of  a  US  company, MatteI. Since  1993,  provisions  regulating  IPR
enforcement by  customs are part  of  the  Russian Customs Code. According  to  these
provisions,  customs  officials can confiscate (but not destroy) counterfeit items at the request
of  the  official  distributor  of  the  company. Furthermore, Russian police  occasionally
Most  important,  penalties  for  IPR organizes raids to  confiscate pirated videocassettes.
violations will increase  in  1997 from $50 and "corrective labor"  to a fme of  $12,000 and
five years imprisonment  (Harmon 1996). All these  developments  indicate an emerging trend
in Russia  towards  stricter enforcement  of IPRs. This trend is likely to mature in the future, as
Russia  continues  its application  process  to the WTO.
A good record on IPR  enforcement is  likely  to  be a  pre-condition  for  Russia's
membership  in the  WTO.  Russia  submitted  an official  application to the WTO in June 1993,
and since then has been  providing information on its current  economic and political situation
to the WTO.  At the next stage  of the application process,  bilateral negotiations for  specific
conditions of Russia's membership  will take place. To satisfy  provisions of the Agreement
on Trade-Related  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under the  Uruguay Round  of  the
GA  Tr,  Russia will  have to  provide  evidence of  strong legal  protection  and  effective
enforcement of IPRs.  Though the discussion  of IPR protection is not likely  to take place
earlier than 1997,  the TRIPS Agreement  may  become  a confrontational issue considering  the
evidence of rampant piracy in Russia. Primarily, strengthening  IPRs in Russia  requires the
improvement  of IPR enforcement,  since  domestic  IPR laws are generally  in line with the legal
protection in major industrialized  countries.11
IV.  ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STRENGTHENING
INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  RIGHTS
Will  Russia benefit from  tightening  IPR protection? The conventional  wisdom
suggests  that economic gains from stronger IPRs  depend on a variety of factors, including
market structure and the capabilities  of innovator and imitator industries,  as well as existing
distortions in the economy. The extent  and nature of direct foreign investment  and its future
also influence gains  and losses  from changes  in the IPR regime. Additionally, since Russia  is
in the process  of transition to a market economy, the sequence  and structure of economic
reforms are critical determinants  of welfare effects. Important  insights into possible costs  and
benefits of strengthening  IPRs are suggested  in the traditional economic literature on IPR
protection.
As in  many developing countries, stronger IPRs in  Russia are likely  to  cause an
adverse  movement in the terms of trade and decline in purchasing power. By  increasing
imitation costs,  stronger  IPRs raise  prices and lower real incomes.  At the same  time, higher
costs curtail imitation and increase  the number of product varieties  manufactured in foreign
industrialized countries. To the extent that Russia  imports such higher priced goods, the
domestic  tenns of trade  worsen. All in all, Russia  loses  from stronger  IPRs due to the decline
in the terms of trade and real income  (see  Helpman 1993).
In contrast  to economies  without indigenous  innovation, strengthening  IPRs in Russia
is likely to generate  welfare gains from an expansion  in domestic R&D  (see La  Croix and
Kawaura 1995, Kawaura and La Croix  1995). Russia  has significant R&D  experience in
many areas,  for example,  aerospace,  material sciences,  lasers,  etc.  Some domestic inventions
match or exceed  comparable  world standards  (Table 2).12
TABLE  2
Technical Level of New Prototypes,  1990.
(units)
Technical  Level Relative to the Highest  World Standard Type Prototypes
Developed
Above Equal  to Below Not identified
















Machines,  equipment,  and apparatus
For  example,
Power  engineering,  diesel  engines
Electrical equipment  and  materials
Medical equipment
Chemical,  pumping  and compressor
equipment
203 8 171 2 22
23 3 19
4
Instruments  and means  of automation
For  example.
Machines  and  instruments  for
measuring  mechanical  values
Technological  process  control  and
regulating  instruments
Physical research  instruments







a. Data refer to the Soviet  Union.
Source: Center  for Science  and Research  Statistics  (CSRS),  Russian  Federation  Ministry of Science  and
Technological Policy and Academy  of Sciences,  1992b,  Science  and Technology  in Russia: 1991,
Moscow, Russia.
By  stimulating  R&D  investment, tighter  IPR  protection  promotes  not  only  quality
improvement,  but also the development  of new  products  and processes  (Table 3).  In addition,
if  new products are tradable,  higher export revenues  are likely to add to the overall welfare
gains.II
11 It is worth noting that Russia's R&D has been  traditionally concentrated  in the defense  sector. With the end of
the cold war and Russia's transition  to a market  economy,  the conversion  of the defense  sector  has been  initiated.
The future growth of Russia's R&D depends  on the success  of the conversion reforms, and in this  regard IPR
protection can become  an important policy  instrument for stimulating commercial R&D.  [See-  Sanchez-Andres
(1995) for the detailed description  of the conversion  process  in Russia's  defense  sector.]13
TABLE 3
Types of Inventions, 1989"
(percent)







a.  Data refer  to the Soviet  Union.
Source: Center  for Science  and Research  Statistics  (CSRS),  Russian  Federation  Ministry of Science  and
Technological Policy and Academy  of Sciences,  1992a,  Nauka  v SSSR:  analiz i statistika,  Moscow,
Russia.
Nonetheless,  net gains from strengthening  IPRs in Russia  are limited by the costs of
adjustment  to  the  new IPR institutions and general public  ignorance of  IPR protection.
Though Russia's government  has rapidly changed formallPR  institutions by  adopting new
IPR  laws, the  development  of  supporting  legal  infrastructure  and  conversion  of  informal
institutions, such  as  traditions,  customs,  and  codes  of conduct,  are likely to take a much longer
Some scientists  and managers  lack experience  and understanding of  patenting and time.
Others naively  consider a  public believe  in  protecting  their  technology by  secrecy.
demonstration  of novelty and authorship  sufficient to protect their inventions.
Frequently, high technology industries and individual inventors fail  to capture the
benefits of international  and domestic  IPR protection  due to their ignorance  and inexperience
in the use of IPRs. According to  Russia's Ministry  of  Science and Technology,  many
international agreements  on technology licensing and international R&D  cooperation are
discriminatory against  Russian  participants  and violate Russian  IPR laws (Buben 1996). In
early  1996, a US delegation, including  experts from  the Departments of  State, Energy,
Defense,  and Commerce,  collaborated with representatives  of Russia's Ministries of Science4
and Technology,  and Defense,  and others in formulating recommendations  on IPR protection
and licensing (Buben 1996).  Even without legal force, these  recommendations  are likely to
assist  Russian scientists and  executives in  drafting  international contracts and  facilitate
mutually  beneficial  participation  of domestic  flfIDS in  international  technology  trade.  In  the
long run, as the familiarity  of Russian  producers with IPR protection grows, welfare gains
from stronger  IPRs are likely to realize  more fully.
Russian  IPR-intensive  exports  require effective IPR protection both domestically and
abroad. To  facilitate  such protection and  prevent an  authorized  copying  of  Russian
intellectual property, an intergovernmental  Russian-Chinese  agreement  on IPR protection was
signed in April 1996. Provisions  of the agreement  stipulate  regular exchange of information
on legal developments  in IPR protection and technology transfer, and cooperation in IPR
enforcement. This agreement  is likely to promote licensing of Russian  technology to China
and may prove useful in the renovation of industrial facilities constructed during 1950s and
1960s  with Russia's  technical  assistance  (Evdokimova  and Blinnikov 1996).
The Soviet legacy  of the state  monopoly on the commercial use of intellectual assets
limits  IPR-intensive  exports.12  In the past, an author certificate  was often  issued in names of
several  inventors representing  different research  institutions and companies In  such cases,
the ownership  of intellectual property was  ill-defined.  Nowadays,  faced with the prospect of
technology  licensing,  individual  inventors  may  disagree about  converting  the  author
12 In some cases  "reverse piracy"  occurs, that is, a transfer of  Russian intellectual  property  with  Russian
inventors  subsequently  questioning the legality  of the transfer  and  bringing  up infringement suits.  The most
famous cases  in this category  include a copyright  on the computer  game Tetris and trademarks  of  Smirnoff vodka.
Invented by a Russian  mathematician  and software  engineer  Aleksei Pazhitnov  in 1985,  Tetris did not receive any
domestic protection,  since at the time Russia  was not a member  of international  IPR conventions  and did not have
a patent law.  The game made  its  way to the world market and for several years was distributed without  any
copyright license (Sinitskii and Liudmirskii  1995).
Prior to Bolshevik revolution,  the trademarks  of  Smirnoff  vodka were a family property of Smirnoffs.  In the early
1930s  the trademarks  were sold to different foreign companies. Eventually, Heubline Inc. became  the exclusive
distributor of  Smirnoff  vodka. According to some  estimates,  the brand of  Smirnoff  vodka was worth $1.4 billion
in  early 1996.  A member  of  Smirnoff family  recently sued  Heubline for the  "unauthorized" trademark use,
questioning the authenticity of  the original  sale of trademark.  A number of similar  IPR cases  are currently
outstanding  in Russian  and US courts (Himelstein,  Galuszka,  and Flynn 1996).15
1995).13
speedy  legal resolution of IPR-related  disputes. The Ministry  of Science and Technology
provision  of  legal  assistance,  dissemination of  infonnation,  and  education of  domestic
producers  on IPR issues.
Another  important  determinant of welfare effects resulting  from  strengthening IPRs  is
market  structure  (see,  for example,  Maskus and Konan 1994, and Subramanian  1994).
The
more imperfectly competitive  is market structure,  the smaller  is the loss of consumer  surplus
from  strengthening  IPRs. To the extent that market structure varies among industries in
Russia,  the welfare effects of  strengthening  IPRs are likely  to differ  across industries. In
highly competitive industries,  such  as retail trade in video and software,  one would expect
substantial  consumer  surplus losses,  while customers  of less  competitive pharmaceutical and
chemical industries to be relatively less  vulnerable  to  strengthening  IPRs. These losses  are
likely to be partially offset by gains from other  sources,  for example,  trade and direct foreign
investment.16
The expansion of trade and direct foreign investmt~nt  under a stronger IPR regime
can bring additional  welfare gains (see for example, Maskus and Penubarti 1995, Maskus  and
Konan  1995, Mansfield 1994). Empirical evidence suggests  that strong IPRs stimulate
bilateral trade, particularly in large countries. Likewise, tightening IPR protection is likely to
promote trade and technology transfer between  Russia  and foreign countries by rendering
protection to firms'  knowledge assets. For the same  reason, stronger IPRs will encourage
direct foreign investment,  particularly in domestic high technology sectors with innovative
potential. Such foreign  investment  is  much needed in  Russia to  facilitate  technological
modernization  and market restructuring.
In a transition economy like Russia,  the welfare analysis of strengthening  IPRs must
take into account  the optimal sequencing  of economic an,d  political  reforms. The corner
stone of Russia's refonns is privatization, including the market transformation of  legal and
financial institutions. The adoption of  new laws and regulations is  the  first  step in  the
privatization process and  should be  complemented by  enforcement through  legal  and
political  institutions.  Furthermore, various economic institutions, primarily  financial  ones,
should support  privatization by providing a favorable economic environment for the growth
of private enterprise. Being inseparable  and reinforcing  parts of  market transition, IPR
refonns  and  privatization  of  physical  assets  should  occur  simultaneously. With  the
origination  of  private  fInnS, IPRs become  the  main  instrument  for  stimulating  innovation,
particularly  in  countries with limited  public  funds.14 R.eciprocally,  IPR  protection  is  a
necessary  complement to  privatization of  physical assets  in  IPR-intensive sectors,  since a
Therefore, meaningful appraisal  of assets  should include the value of intellectual property.
14 Historically, private property in land and physical capital has emerg:ed  before  IPRs.  This historical  pattern
may not  apply to  transition  economies in  a global  world undergoing international  harmonization of  IPR
protection.17
for the successful  implementation  of market  reforms, privatization of physical and intellectual
assets  should proceed  in parallel.IS
V.  POLICY  DIRECTIONS  AND CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Successful  transition to a market economy necessitates  tightening IPR protection in
Russia. With the country becoming  integrated  in the world economy,  Russian  companies  gain
experience  and stakes  in the international protection of IPRs.  In the author's opinion, the
primary  role  of  public  policy  in  Russia lies  in  promoting  the  development of  legal
infrastructure for  IPR protection rather than direct regulation and control  of  technology
transfer  and licensing. Additionally, the government  should actively engage  in dissemination
of  information and education of domestic producers in  IPR protection and international
practices in trade and technology  transfer. Public provision of legal assistance  on IPR issues
to domestic producers is  likely  to  reduce the costs of  their  adjustment to  the new IPR
institutions and hence  realize benefits of IPR protection  sooner.
Another role of Russia's government  lies in limiting piracy and taking measures  to
enforce IPRs.  Stronger IPR enforcement  is imperative for stimulating domestic innovation,
international trade, and foreign direct investment  in Russia. Furthermore,  the country has to
upgrade  IPR enforcement  to proceed  with its application process  in the WTO.  Improvement
of  IPR  enforcement  is  likely  to  be  gradual,  as time  is needed  for  the  development  of  the
judicial infrastructure  to complement  existing legal protection.16
15 Besides the problem of sequencing  market reforms, transition economies have another distinct feature --
numerous  non-market  distortions.  With such  distortions as excessive government regulation, entry restrictions,
import  substitution  policies,  etc., welfare effects depend on the  intel~action  among IPRs and other  policy
instruments.  As the conventional economic literature demonstrates,  in the second-best  world welfare effects of
policy changes  are ambiguous.
16 In the interim, the implementation  of some  specific policy can advance  Russia's IPR protection and18
Like  most transition economies,  Russia  is an intermediate  case  in the current debate
over the international harmonization of IPRs. The long history of indigenous R&D makes
Russia  close  to industrialized  countries,  while the need for t~~chnological  modernization gives
Russia  a case  for imitation.  Though  economic  losses  due to piracy in Russia  are comparable
to those in  many Asia-Pacific countries, Russia  has inhere:nt  incentives to  strengthen IPRs
soon,  as its market  reforms and application  to the WTO progress  further.
at the same  time benefit foreign companies. Dratler and Sherwood's (1995) proposal, for  example, relies  on
historical precedents  after  the First and Second  World Wars,  when  the United States  extended  priority periods  to its
wartime adversaries  in compensation  for the disruption of international commerce  and patenting during the wars.
Similar extended  priority periods for Russia  would allow Russian technology, first disclosed in Russia but never
made  the subject of a United States patent application, to become  the subject of a priority  period.  Dratler and
Sherwood  suggested  the length  of this extended  period  be five to ten  years  from the date of the application for the
Russian patent or author certificate  or publication.  This  policy  would give  the  West access to  Russia's
technological wealth, while providing capital and facilitating Russia's tnmsition to the market.19
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